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Abstract
This paper explores the role of geography in economic development and demographic
transition. It presents a growth model where survival is endogenously determined and
where the odds of survival and the returns to labor are higher in geographically favorable
regions. Higher life expectancy prompts parents to devote more of their resources to
old-age consumpion and enjoyment. Consequently, they invest relatively more in the
quantity and quality of their o®spring. Investment in education, together with population
growth, eventually triggers technological progress. As the level of technology improves and
life expectancy rises along with it, a geographically advantageous economy ¯rst enters a
post-Malthusian regime during which both fertility and educational attainment increase.
Then, as further improvements in technology lead to a higher education premium, such
an economy undergoes a demographic transition during which life expectancy continues
to rise and parents have fewer but more educated children. In regions where geography
is more adverse, this transition does not take place and economies remain trapped in the
Malthusian regime. Thus, accounting for the role of geography in development helps to
link demographic transition to geography and shows that the latter a®ects the economy
mostly indirectly through the impact of geography on households' demographic choices.
In the early stages of development, those choices in turn determine whether economies
attain the scale and scope necessary for sustained economic progress. The paper also
provides a framework with which to assess why geography may matter less today.
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There is a recent debate about the role of geography versus that of institutions in eco-
nomic progress. This debate revolves primarily around whether geographic characteris-
tics or institutions account for the contemporary cross-country di®erences in economic
prosperity, and there is a growing body of evidence to shed doubt on a direct geography
e®ect.1 Nonetheless, most ¯ndings to date are consistent with the view that geography
was important in the emergence of agriculture and early development.2 Moreover, there
exist inextricable links between economic development and demographic trends in the
very long run.3 This paper presents a uni¯ed, very long run economic growth theory
that focuses on geography. By doing so, it links early development and demographic
transition to geography and demonstrates that the latter a®ects economic development
mostly indirectly{through the impact of geography on households' demographic choices.
Those choices, which entail the quantity and the quality of o®spring, in turn determine
whether economies eventually attain the scale and scope necessary for sustained techno-
logical progress. The framework presented also provides an assessment of why geography
may matter less today.
The 20th century witnessed an astounding change in the standards of living in the
Western Hemisphere. Conservative estimates show, for example, that the average income
in the United States rose tenfold in the last 125 years. Sharp increases in educational
attainment, improvements in life expectancy, and signi¯cant declines in fertility and
mortality also characterized this period of rapid wealth accumulation in \Industrialized
countries."
Two facts make this progress all the more remarkable: First, there exist huge dis-
parities in economic conditions across the world today. A highly publicized estimate
by the World Bank shows, for example, that roughly one billion people still live on less
than one dollar a day.4 And the per capita incomes of rich industrialized nations are
roughly 25 times those of the poor sub-Saharan African economies. The existing wide
gap in the cross-country income distribution is, for the most part, a manifestation of the
1For recent evidence and an extensive survey of the literature on the geography versus institutions
debate, see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
2McNeill (1998, p. 67) claims that the reason why Africa remained backward in the development of
agriculture compared to temperate lands is that the latter exacted much lower costs in terms of exposure
to disease.
3See, for example, Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2000), and Jones (2001).
4See, for example, Dollar and Kraay (2001).
1sustained economic progress that took place in Europe and some of its o®shoots in the
last century. Second, human existence for the most part was synonymous with misery.
Even after human societies settled down to create the ¯rst agrarian economies around
10,000 B.C., living conditions did not change signi¯cantly. For nearly 12,000 years after
the First Agrarian Revolution, the economic environment remained stagnant. During
that long period, higher economic output due to slight improvements in the sophistica-
tion of existing technologies or milder climate conditions generated higher fertility and
more rapid population growth. With limited amount of ¯xed resources, such as agricul-
tural land, and relatively primitive technologies prior to the Industrial Revolution, faster
population growth guaranteed that improvements in the standards of living would be
short-lived. In the long run, this in turn meant that the size of the population would
remain relatively °at. This was unambiguously the case for most of human existence: In
the period between 100,000 B.C. and 10,000 B.C., the annual world population growth
rate is estimated to have been 0.0016 percent a year. In the roughly 11,500 year period
betweenthe FirstAgrarian Revolutionand1500 A.D., world populationgrew from about
6 million to 425 million. That translates into a less than 0.04 percent annual population
growth rate over that time.5
As late as the 18th century this cycle had not yet been broken. In 1798, Thomas
Malthus made his famous prediction that fertility and birth rates would always respond
positively to higher incomes and thus would ensure that economic prosperity and hu-
man population would be bound by the limited amount of global resources. Since then,
however, a remarkable transition that rendered the Malthusian world obsolete has taken
place. In the \post-Malthusian" era, population growth rates rose sharply in response
to rising per capita incomes. As a consequence, the world population exploded to reach
6 billion at the end of the 20th century from about 1 billion one hundred years ago. In
Europe and its o®shoots where per capita incomes have risen sharply since the Industrial
Revolution, population growth rates initially responded positively by averaging 0.4 per-
cent between 1700 and 1820, and 0.7 percent between 1820 and 1900. By the early 20th
century, the Industrialized countries had entered a new \demographic transition" era
during which per capita income growth kept rising, and population growth surprisingly
began declining. These demographic changes, which contradicted those predicted by the
Malthusian model, have consequently led modern economists to develop theories that
5See Maddison (1982), Livi-Bacci (1997), and Weil (2001).
2show how technological progress and higher returns to education might lead households
to have fewer but more educated children.6 One of the major tasks that remained, how-
ever, was reconciling the Malthusian predictions with those of the modern development
theories. In recent years, uni¯ed growth and development theories that address this issue
have emerged. Primary among those are Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2000),
and Jones (2001).7
In this paper, I contribute to this emergent and important literature by highlight-
ing the role of geography in the very long-run evolution of human kind. The novelty
of my approach is the emphasis on geography, warranted by two related ¯ndings: First,
geographic characteristics were important in the emergence of agriculture and early de-
velopment. Second, economic development and demographic trends are related in the
very long run. Taken together these ¯ndings suggest that accounting for the role of
geography in the evolution of human societies could be important. And the reason is
that, by in°uencing the odds of survival and life expectancy at least in the early stages
of development, geography has the potential to a®ect many household choices{including
but not con¯ned to those regarding the quantity and quality of o®spring.
In order to incorporate the role of geography into development and demograph-
ics, I present an overlapping generations model in which technological progress, fertility,
and life expectancy are all endogenously determined. In geographically favorable regions
survival odds are higher. Parents in such areas expect to live longer compared to indi-
viduals who live in less hospitable regions. This in turn prompts them to allocate more
of their resources to old-age consumption and enjoyment. Hence, higher life expectancy
makes parents invest more in both the quantity and quality of their o®spring. In regions
where geographical characteristics are more adverse, individuals struggle for survival.
These parents devote all of their limited resources to consumption and to having chil-
dren. They do not invest in the education of their young. As a result, economies in
geographically disadvantageous regions never escape the Malthusian trap: Technology
remains primitive, life expectancy and population growth low, and mortality high.
6See, for example, Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), Galor and Weil (1996), and Iyigun (2000).
7More broadly, these papers fall within a strand of the literature that focuses on the process of
economic growth in the very long run. This broader strand includes, among others, papers by Kremer
(1993) and Hansen and Prescott (2000). However, unlike the paper presented here and the ones listed
above, these papers either do not completely endogenize the processes of technological change and
population growth or do not generate the demographic transition from the Malthusian model to the
modern regime.
3In geographically favorable regions, however, a di®erent story unfolds. Since exist-
ing technologies are not very sophisticated during the initial stages of development, life
expectancy, fertility and the average education levels remain relatively low even in these
regions. But steady population growth and investment in education combine to even-
tually trigger a process of technological change. This in turn improves life expectancy
further and geographically favorable economies enter the post-Malthusian phase during
which both fertility and educational attainment increase. And eventually, as technolo-
gies become more sophisticated and the returns to education rise along with it, a geo-
graphically advantageous area enters the demographic transition regime under which life
expectancy and educational attainment continue to rise, but parents start to have fewer
children.
In this model, the sophistication of existing technologies a®ects fertility and educa-
tion via two channels. First, the \life-expectancy" e®ect: Because technological progress
leads to higher incomes, it improves the likelihood that any given individual will survive
to live longer. And this manifests itself through a shift in the amount of total resources
allocatedto old-age enjoyment, theresult of which includes{but is not con¯nedto{having
more children. Second, the \education-premium" e®ect: A more sophisticated technol-
ogy raises the return to education and encourages parents to shift from quantity towards
quality. Thus, fertility rates will ¯rst rise andthen fall over the course of economic devel-
opment if the life-expectancy e®ect dominates in the early stages of development and the
education-premium e®ect in°uences its later stages.8 This, in fact, is what generates the
regime shift from the post-Malthusian era{during which per capita incomes and popu-
lation growth rates were positively related{to the demographic transition regime{where
the relationship between per capita income and fertility rates have reversed.
In addition to generating the very-long-run relationship between technological
change and demographic transition from the Malthusian regime to the modern one,
an emphasis on geography in a uni¯ed growth framework provides further insights. For
8There are both empirical and theoretical underpinnings of such a mechanism. Goldin and Katz
(1998), for example, ¯nd evidence that the technology-skill complementarity originated with the shift in
manufacturing to batch and continuous-process methods, as well as the adoption of electricity motors.
All of those occured in the 1890s and beyond{well after life expectancy began to rise dramatically in
the late-18th and early-19th centuries due to better nutrition (see McNeill, 1998).
Acemoglu (1998) presents a model in which the direction of technical change is determined endoge-
nously according to the fraction of skilled (or educated) workers in the economy. Thus, his approach
provides a theoretical basis for which to believe that the e®ects of the technology-skill complementarity
becomes more pronounced later during the development process.
4example, it demonstrates why the roots of modern civilization lie in the geographi-
cally advantageous climates of Eurasia; how geographical adversity manifests itself in a
struggle for survival where life expectancy remains low and individuals devote a dispro-
portionate amount of their limited resources to sustenance and procreation; and why the
emergence of institutions that promote technology adoption might diminish the role of
geography in development and demography.
As I alluded to earlier, this paper is most related to the uni¯ed growth models.
Galor and Weil (2000) develop a framework that focuses primarily on the link between
human capital accumulation and technological progress. In their model, economies even-
tually escape the Malthusian trap because of the scale e®ects of population size on tech-
nological progress. Galor and Moav (2000) argue that the process of natural selection
gives individuals whovalue relatively more the quality of their o®spring a survival advan-
tage. They then demonstrate that the emergence of mutations that value child quality
more is su±cient to kick start a phase of demographic transition and economic devel-
opment that is consistent with those observed in modern developed economies. Jones
(2001) combines the human capital-based theory of economic growth with endogenous
fertility and mortality to demonstrate that the very-long term patterns of economic de-
velopment and demographic change can be generated in the presence of two external
shocks{improvements in property rights and temporary declines in total productivity.
The present e®ort di®ers from these papers by its emphasis on geographic characteristics
as the driving force behind the patterns of demographic change and economic develop-
ment that took place throughout human history.
This model is also related to empirical work that addresses{directly or indirectly{
whether geographic characteristics or institutional features primarily impact economic
performance. Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) and Sachs (2000, 2001) ¯nd that
location and climate have large e®ects on the level and growth of incomes per capita
because they impact agricultural productivity, disease burdens, and transport costs. In
contrast, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (forthcoming, 2001) argue that the simple
geography hypothesis, which suggests a direct link between climate and economic devel-
opment, is inconsistent with available historical data. Their ¯ndings instead show that
institutional di®erences help to explain most of the cross-country variation in incomes.
Hall and Jones (1999) demonstrate how, while geographic location helps to account for
a signi¯cant portion of the cross-country di®erences in output per worker, at least some
5of this might be due to the indirect role of geography in shaping institutions. What I
present below di®ers from these papers on two important accounts: First, my approach
is almost purely theoretical. And second, my emphasis on geography over the very long
run helps to identify that geography a®ects the economy mostly indirectly via its impact
on economic decisions and demographics.
2. The Building Blocks
The model rests on the following key assumptions:
I) Geographic characteristics a®ect labor productivity. Hall and Jones show that tem-
perate climates positively a®ect productivity and that geography helps to explain at
least some of the 369 percent variation in output per worker between the most and least
favorably located countries. In a similar vein, Gallup et al. demonstrate that the one
channel through which climate has a positive e®ect on both the level and growth of
incomes is via agricultural productivity. Masters and McMillan (2001) show that, since
the early 1960s, temperate countries have converged towards higher levels of income due,
at least in part, to their climates while tropical nations have converged towards various
levels of income. Diamond (1998) is a recent but in°uential book that also addresses
this topic. It provides evidence that local geographic conditions, such as climate, the
availability of domesticable plants and animals, proximity to abundant natural resources
help to explain why many civilizations in history have emerged in geographically favor-
able regions. And Jones (1981) notes \income per capita was higher in Europe than in
Asia partly because natural disasters were fewer."
II) Endogenous survival odds. In this model, the odds of survival (or mortality) are
determined endogenously according to individuals' incomes. Speci¯cally, I consider an
overlapping generations model in which individuals could live up to three periods and
assume that there exists uncertainty about survival during the ¯nal old-age period.9
This formulation has its analogs in other work. For example, a more discrete version of
9There are at least two alternative speci¯cations of survival probability. First, one could assume
that survival depends not on income but consumption. Then, in determining their optimal consumption
pattern and the amount of resources devoted to their children, individuals would have to take into
account not only the marginal utility of consumption but also the marginal e®ect of consumption on
their own survival. This speci¯cation, unlike the one I choose to present here, would not allow closed
form solutions but its qualitative results would be similar to what is below. Second, while I abstract
from child mortality and focus on adult mortality only, the model could be extended to include the
former without signi¯cantly altering the qualitative nature of the main results.
6this approach has its precedents in models where consumption below a subsistence level
leads to extinction. This is in fact the approach taken by Galor and Weil, Galor and
Moav, and Jones (2001). Also there exists papers in which survival is modeled in similar
fashion to the one presented below.10
Since (I) links individuals' incomes to geographic characteristics, the idea that
incomes in°uence survival also implies that mortality should be higher if the climate
is adverse and natural resources are scarce.11 Indeed, Wrigley and Scho¯eld (1989)
¯nd that mortality in England between 1541 and 1871 was increased by unusually cold
temperatures in winter and by extremely hot temperatures in summer. Jones (1981)
discusses that a hot environment of human and animal diseases in Africa kept the rates
of mortality high and the level of population down.
III) Parents value both the quantity and quality of o®spring. Individuals in this model
operate in the traditional Beckerian mold.12 That is, household fertility is driven by a
utility function that has as its arguments individuals' own consumption as well as the
quantity and quality of their o®spring. Given this Beckerian quality-quantity tradeo®,
parents devote a larger fraction of their incomes to their children (either in the form of
more orbettereducated o®spring) as their self-survival oddsimprovedueto technological
change.
IV) Technological progress raises the return to education. While combining endogenous
survival with the quality-quantity tradeo® is important in generating a higher fraction
of income being devoted to the o®spring, it does not yield the result that the optimal
number of children ¯rst increases and then decreases as the level of technology improves.
Rather, the mechanism that generates a decline in fertility is driven by higher returns
to education due to improvements in technology. Indeed, Nelson and Phelps (1966)
and Schultz (1975) provide ample evidence that suggests this is the case. Bartel and
Lichtenberg (1991) and Bartel and Sicherman (1999) show that industries that use new
technologies pay higher wages toworkers with the samelevels of experienceandeducation
than industries that use older technology. There is also evidence that technological
10See, for example, Grossman and Mendoza (2000).
11This, of course, is associated with the \positive check" on population growth identi¯ed by Malthus.
He envisaged two sets of relationships that might serve to keep a population in balance with its economic
resources. In both cases, an increase in population exerts pressure on food prices and lowers real incomes.
Positive check operates through increases in mortality, and the preventive check manifests itself in lower
nuptiality and fertility. Refer to Wrigley and Scho¯eld (1989, pp. 458-466) for more details.
12Becker (1981).
7progress increases the return to an unobservable component of skill not accounted for
by education and experience.13 Juhn, Murphy, and Brooks (1993) demonstrate that the
reward to the unobservable component of skills has increased over the period 1963-1989,
a period which witnessed the implementation of many new technologies.
V) Human capital and population size a®ect the pace of technological progress. Finally, I
employ the hypothesis that the stock of human capital (or the average education level) of
an economy and its population size positively in°uence its rate of technological progress.
The link betweenhuman capital and technological change is crucial in my model as it ac-
counts for the mechanism that sustains technological progress and generates{via changes
in the education premium{the demographic transition.14 The link between population
size and technological progress captures the idea that, for a given level of education,
a larger population generates greater demand and supply and more rapid di®usion of
ideas. That technological change is also linked to population size, a la Kremer (1993)
and Galor and Weil (2000), is not as essential for the qualitative results below although
it helps to delay the onset of the transition from the Malthusian state to the modern
one.
In the following two sections, I incorporate these assumptions into an endogenous
growthmodel andexamine their implications for economic development anddemographic
trends. In Section 5, I discuss how the emergence of institutions that promote technology
transfers would render geography less important. InSection6, Icalibrate some numerical




Consider an overlapping generations economy in which real economic activity extends
over an in¯nite discrete time. Inevery period the economy produces asingle homogenous
good using e±ciency units of labor. The supply of aggregate e±ciency units of labor is
determined by the size of the work force and the human capital inherent in each worker.
13Galor and Tsiddon (1997) review several other studies that support the idea that technological
progress increases the return to ability (unobservable component of human capital) in addition to the
ones mentioned here.
14For surveys of the human capital and technological change link, see for example, Nelson and Phelps,
Schultz, and Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987).
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where At represents the endogenously determined technology level in period t; Gj is a
parameter that measures the hospitability of region j to output production, and where
H
j
t is the e±ciency units of labor supply.15
By assumption there are no property rights over G and its rate of return is zero.
The labor market is competitive and human capital is paid its marginal product:16
wt = At G. (2)
3.2. Individuals
Individuals, who are identical, live for up to three periods in overlapping generations.
All individuals survive youth and young adulthood but only some live to become old.
Although there is uncertainty about who reaches old age, a higher level of income im-
proves the survival odds. Each individual has a single parent and is endowed with a unit
of time in every period. When young, a member of generation t¡1 consumes a fraction
of her parent's time. This time requirement increases with the child's education level. In
the second period of life, t, the individual is a young adult. During this period she works,
consumes, and procreates, allocating her time between employment and child rearing.
In the ¯nal old-age period, t+ 1; the individual retires and consumes if she survives to
live that long.
15For simplicity of notation, I will supress the geography superscript j hereafter unless the discussion
warrrants its inclusion.
16By assuming there are constant returns to human capital, the model abstracts from how changes in
the level of population might in°uence wage rates. In fact, the negative link between the size of the labor
force and wage rates provided the main channel through which the positive and preventive Malthusian
checks operated (see footnote 11). The model presented here could be easily extended to ensure that
population shocks lead to changes in the real wage rate, and therefore, that short-run deviations from
the subsistence equilibrium self-correct in the medium run.
93.2.1. Preferences and Budget Constraints
Individuals' preferences are de¯ned over their expected consumption and the quantity
and quality of children that they have. Resources that are devoted to improving genetic
survival{via quantity and/or quality investment in the o®spring{reduce the availability




t+1 respectively denote the consumption




t+1 respectively denote the number of her children and their average future income.
Preferences of this individual are represented by the following inter-temporal utility
function:
Ut¡1 = ln ct¡1
t + ®pt+1lnct¡1
t+1 + (1+ pt+1)[¯ln nt¡1
t + (1 ¡ ¯)ln It
t+1];
(3)
where ® 2 (0; 1), and ¯ 2 (1=2;1). In (3), the parameter ® measures the rate of
consumption time preference, ¯ the value associated with thenumber ofo®spring relative
to average quality as measured by future income, and pt+1, 0 · pt+1 · 1; the probability
of surviving young adulthood.17 The latter is an increasing, concave function of income.
That is, pt+1 = p(I
t¡1
t ): I assume that this probability satis¯es the following properties:
p0 > 0; p00 < 0; p(0) = 0, p(1) = p · 1, limI!0p0 = 1, and limI!1p0 = 0: Note also
that the life expectancy of all individuals in this economy equals 2+ pt+1.
Following the standard Beckerian model of household fertility, individuals decide
the optimal number of their children and the education level of each subject to a budget
constraint that re°ects the allocation of time between work and child rearing. To for-
malize, let et+1 denote the education level of each child, and let ¿n and ¿e respectively
denote the time costs of rearing a child and educating one for a unit of time. Then, for a
member of generation t¡ 1, nt(¿n + ¿eet+1) denotes the total time cost of child rearing
and education.
Given that amember ofgenerationt¡1 works in the following periodandpossesses
ht e±ciency units of labor at that time, her income, It, is equal to wtht. She allocates
this potential income among current consumption, saving for future consumption and
child rearing and education. Thus, she faces the following budget constraint:
17Note that both the number and the average expected income of an individuals' o®spring do not




t+1: Hereafter, I will also suppress super-
scripts that identify generations unless the speci¯c reference requires their explicit notation.
10wthtnt(¿
n + ¿
eet+1) + ct + St · wtht = It (4)
where St denotes the individual's amount of saving in period t.18
3.2.2. Population, Education, and Technological Progress
The size of the working population at time t+ 1, Lt+1, is given by
Lt+1 = ntLt ; (5)
where Lt is the working population in period t, nt is the number of children per parent,
and nt ¡ 1, is the growth rate of the working population.19 The size of the population
at time 0, L0, is given historically.
In order to employ a relatively simple human capital accumulation process, I em-
phasize only the notionthat the sophistication of existing technologies a®ects the returns
to education.20 In particular, I assume that each person's human capital is determined
in the following speci¯c way:
ht+1 = 1 + Át et+1; Át = Á(At); (6)
where 8 At > 0; Á(At) > 0; Á0 > 0; and Á00 · 0:21 According to (6), the child's level of
human capital is equal to one when her parent devotes no time to her education.
At any given time t + 1; I assume that technological progress is endogenously
determined by the average education level of workers; et, and the size of the working
population, Lt: That is,
18I assume that there exists a costless storage technology that allows individuals to transfer part of
their current potential consumption to the future.
19Note that, at any given time t, total population equals [1 + nt + pt=nt¡1]Lt. This suggests that
total population would equal 3Lt if the growth rate of population was zero and the odds of survival
were one.
20Of course, by doing so I abstract from various channels through which the level of parental human
capital or the rate of technological progress can potentially a®ect human capital formation. See Galor
and Tsiddon (1997) for a detailed survey. The qualitative nature of the results are invariant to the
inclusion of these variables.
21The assumption that the marginal product of human capital is constant is also made for convenience
only and does not alter the main results.
11At+1 ¡ At
At
´ gt+1 = g(et; Lt); (7)
where 8 et > 0; and 8 Lt > L¤ > 0, g(et; Lt) > 0; ge; gL > 0; gee; gLL · 0, and
where 8 et > 0 and 8 Lt · L¤, g(et; Lt) = 0: The above speci¯cation implies that for
a strictly positive average education level and a su±ciently large population size, the
rate of technological progress is positive. Otherwise, if the average education level of
the working age population is zero or the size of the population is relatively small, the
rate of technological progress is zero.22 Like the size of the population, the level of the
technology at time 0; A0, is also given historically.
One could think of the variable At more broadly to cover the impact of institu-
tions such as the legal and ¯nancial system, property rights and intellectual property
on productive activities. Then the formulation in (7) would suggest that the creation of
more e®ective institutions over time are also driven by the average education level of the
economy{once the level of population reaches a certain threshold.
3.2.3. Geography, Life Expectancy, and the Quantity-Quality Tradeo®
Members of generation t ¡ 1 maximize (3) by choosing the number and education of
their o®spring, and their own optimal consumption pattern. Substituting equations (2),
(4), and (6) into (3), and expressing the amount of saving, St¡1
t , as a fraction of total
potential income (i.e., St = stwtht), the problem of a representative individual can be
written as follows:
22This formulation is identical to the one employed by Galor and Weil (2000) and is designed to
incorporate the role of scale e®ects in technological progress a la Kremer. As I alluded to earlier in
Section 2, part V, the qualitative nature of the results I present below is only dependent on the link
between human capital and technological progress, although their quantitative nature{in particular the
extended delay of the onslaught of the post-Malthusian era{depends on both population and human
capital playing a role in technological progress.
12fnt;et+1;stg = argmax
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
ln wtht[1¡ nt(¿n +¿eet+1) ¡ st]
+ ®pt+1ln stwtht + ¯(1+ pt+1)ln nt
+ (1 ¡ ¯)(1+ pt+1)lnwt+1(1 +Átet+1)
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
(8)
subject to (nt;et+1;st) ¸ 0:
The ¯rst term in equation (8) corresponds to ln ct¡1
t , the second to ®pt+1ln ct¡1
t+1,
and the third and fourth to (1 +pt+1)[¯ln nt¡1
t + (1 ¡ ¯)ln It
t+1]:
The ¯rst-order condition with respect to each of the arguments, nt;et+1;st, are

















1 ¡ nt(¿n +¿eet+1) ¡ st
· 0
Given the properties of the survival function, pt+1, an interior solution will always
exist for the optimal number of children, nt, and the share of total income earmarked
for second period consumption, st. That is not the case, however, with respect to opti-
mal education, et+1. More speci¯cally, there exists low enough values of the technology
parameter, At; and of geographic characteristics, G, that the odds of survival are rela-
tively low. For such values, the optimal amount of education per child equals zero. For
other values, an interior solution exists for all control variables and we can determine





1+ ¯ + (® +¯)pt+1
(10)
13nt =
(2¯ ¡ 1)(1 + pt+1)
1 + ¯ + (®+ ¯)pt+1
Át
Át¿n ¡ ¿e; (11)
et+1 =
(1 ¡¯)Át¿n ¡ ¯¿e




1 + ¯ + (® + ¯)pt+1
(13)
Equations (10)-(13) illustrate the in°uence of both survival uncertainty and the
returns to education on optimal choices:
Remark 1: (i) 8 (nt; et+1; st) >> 0 that satisfy (10)-(13), higher survival







(ii) 8 (nt; et+1; st) >> 0 that satisfy (10)-(13), higher returns to education,







Noting that pt+1 = p(It) = p(AtGht) and Át = Á(At); we identify that the sophis-
tication of existing technologies a®ects optimal fertility through two channels. First,
the \life-expectancy" e®ect: Because technological progress leads to higher incomes, it
improves the likelihood that any given individual will survive to live three periods. As
Remark 1 suggests, this manifests itself in a shift in the total amount of resources al-
located to old-age enjoyment since both the saving rate, st, and the total amount of
resources devoted to the upbringing of the o®spring, nt(¿n + ¿eet+1), rise. Second, the
\education-premium" e®ect: A more sophisticated technology raises the return to ed-
ucation, and again due to Remark 1, this propagates the shift from quantity towards
14quality. Hence, while technological progress unambiguously raises the optimal education
level of each o®spring, it may increase, decrease, or even leave unchanged the optimal
number of o®spring depending on which of the above-mentioned e®ects dominates.
More speci¯cally, net fertility rates will ¯rst rise and then fall over the course
of economic development if the life-expectancy e®ect dominates in the early stages of
development and the education-premium e®ect in°uences its later stages.23 In order to
incorporate this idea into the model, consider
Assumption A.1: limAt!0
p0
Á0 = 1 and limAt!1
p0
Á0 = 0.
Assumption A.1 guarantees that improvements in the level of technology raise sur-
vival odds more than the education premium when the technology is relatively primitive.
It also ensures vice versa when the technology is more sophisticated. Now let
¨¤ ´ f(At;et;gt;G)j p0 ¸ °Á0g; (14)
where ° ´ f(1 + pt+1)[1 + ¯ + (® +¯)(1 + pt+1)]¿eÁ0g=f(1+ ¯)Át(Át¿n ¡ ¿e)p0g: Then,
Proposition 1 follows:
Proposition 1: 8 At ¸ 0, technological progress (i) raises the fraction of








and under (A.1) (iii) leads to higher (lower) fertility in the early (late) stages
of development,






> 0 i® (At;et;gt;G) 2 ¨¤
· 0 i® (At;et;gt;G) = 2 ¨¤
:
Proof: See Appendix section 9.1.
In sum, the optimization problem speci¯ed by (8) implies the following: First,
given the human capital accumulation process described by (6), there is no guarantee
that the returns to education will warrant individuals to train their o®spring. In fact,
the ¯rst-order condition for et+1 in (9) suggests that there exists a set ~ ¨ such that, 8
(At; et; gt; G) >> 0;
~ ¨ ´ f(At; et; gt; G)j(1¡ ¯)Á(At)pt+1 ¡ ¿
ent=(1¡ ¿
nnt ¡ st) · 0g:
(15)
Thus, 8 (At; et; gt; G) 2 ~ ¨; the combination of geography, technology and human
capital is such that parents do not ¯nd it optimal to educate their young. Their struggle
for survival dictates that all of their time and resources are devoted to having children
and ensuring some old-age consumption. Put somewhat di®erently, when survival is
relatively more di±cult, individuals cut down on the consumption of the goods that
they enjoy disproportionately more when they get old (which under this formulation
is the quantity and the quality of their o®spring and old-age consumption). Moreover,
because individuals' resources are scarce, the number of o®spring individuals have and
the amount of resources they devote to old-age consumption are still relatively low.
8 (At; et; gt; G) = 2 ~ ¨, individuals educate their o®spring as well. The amount of
time they choose to devote to their o®spring's education increases as the sophistication
of existing technologies improves. And as long as (At;et; gt;G) 2 ¨¤; they also choose to
have more childreninresponse to technological change. In contrast if (At;et; gt;G) = 2¨¤,
individuals have fewer but more educated children in response to technological progress.
Figure 1 shows how the optimal saving rate, st, number of children, nt, and their
average education levels, et+1, evolve as the technology, At, improves. While the optimal
saving rate and the average education levels increase monotonically in At, the optimal
number of o®spring is a hump-shaped function of it.
16[Figure 1 about here.]
Before moving on to the dynamics, note that geography a®ects this economy both
directly and indirectly. On the one hand, geographic characteristics directly in°uence
the production process. Therefore, they help determine the productivity of labor. On
the other hand, these characteristics a®ect labor income and labor income determines
the odds of survival. And as we have identi¯ed above, the latter impacts household
decisions regarding fertility, education and saving for old-age consumption.24
4. The Dynamics
There are two state variables in our economy: The level of technology, At, and the
average education level of workers, et. At any given time t, technological sophistication
alone determines the returns to education, Át, and the two state variables{together with
the economy's geographic characteristics, G{in°uence survival, pt+1. The returns to
education and survival odds, in turn, a®ect the optimal quantity and quality of children,
nt and et+1, as well as saving for old-age consumption, st+1. The average education of
workers then determines the rate of technological progress, gt+1, and the sophistication
of technologies in the future, At+1. Thus, the state variables evolve according to the
following ¯rst-order di®erence equations:
At+1 = [1+ g(et; Lt)] At
(16)
et+1 = e(At)
The dynamic evolution of an economy will be driven by the historically and geo-
graphically given quadruplet (A0; e0; g0; G). Given these initial conditions, the dynamic
system will be in one of two possible regimes at any given time t. In this section, I ¯rst
24Another indirect channel through which geography could potentially manifest itself in the demo-
graphic makeup of regions is migration. Although the model here abstracts from the idea that geo-
graphic characteristics might in°uence migration °ows, the incorporation of such an endogenous mech-
anism would serve to further propagate the indirect e®ects of geography on demographic and economic
changes.
17informally discuss the two regimes and then more formally characterize the long-run
equilibrium of the economy in Proposition 2.
(I) (A0; e0; g0; G) 2 ~ ¨ : One possibility is that the initial values of the two state
variables, the rate of technological progress and geographic conditions, (A0; e0; g0; G), do
not lead to high enough survival odds initially, p1. This is the case in which an economy
is trapped in Malthusian stagnation. Survival is hard enough that a disproportionately
large fraction of individuals' incomes are allocated to themselves rather than their o®-
spring. Moreover, whatever time individuals choose to allocate to their young is only
devoted to rearing them as the returns to education is low enough that parents choose
not to educate their young at all. In this case, 8t > 0, et+1 = 0 ) gt+2 = g(0) = 0. As
a result, technology remains primitive and life expectancy remains low. Fertility either
sustains a very low population growth (which, for the most part, maintains a steady or
slightly increasing population level) or leads to negative populationgrowth (whichlowers
the level of population). Such an economy is then characterized by the following, 8t >
0,
At+2 = At+1 = A1;
et+1 = 0; ht+1 = 1;




1 + ¯ + (®+¯)p(A1G) Q 1;
st = ¹ s0 ´
® p(A1G)
1 + ¯ + (®+¯)p(A1G):
(17)
(II) (A0; e0; g0; G) = 2 ~ ¨ : The other possibility is that the initial values of the two
state variables, the rate of technological progress and geographic conditions, (A0; e0; g0;
G), allow for relatively high survival initially, p1. Under this case, individuals expect to
live longer. Consequently, they devote more of their resources to old-age consumption
and the upbringing of o®spring. Moreover, given that the returns to education are also
relatively high, young adults also choose to educate their children. At ¯rst, when the
size of the working population is relatively small so that Lt · L¤, the investment in
the training of the young does not generate technological progress. However, as the size
18of the population gradually increases and reaches a su±ciently high level so that Lt >
L¤, an era of technological progress eventually ensues. As Proposition 1 suggests, this
generates further increases in the fraction of time allocated to education. Thus under
this scenario a steady state does not exist and the economy grows forever. The economy
does not even reach a Balanced GrowthPath (BGP) over a ¯nite period of time, and only
as t ! 1 does it approach a BGP where technological progress, gt+1, life expectancy,
(2+pt+1), fertility, nt, educational attainment, et+1, stabilize, andthe level of technology,
At, improves at a steady rate.
With respect to population growth, there are two sub-cases to consider under
(II): If (A0;e0; g0;G) 2 ¨¤; technological progress initially leads to faster population
growth. But as technological sophistication improves, the combination of technology,
parental education and geographic characteristics becomes such that (At;et; gt;G) = 2 ¨¤
and population growth eventually declines. In contrast, if (A0;e0; g0;G) = 2 ¨¤, then
population growth monotonically decreases as the level of technology improves. As t !
1, an economy that starts out in regime (II) converges to the following BGP:
At+1 = (1 + ¹ g) At; ¹ g ´ g(¹ e; 1);




¿e > 0; ht+1 = ¹ h = 1 + ¹ e;
nt = ¹ n1 ´
(2¯ ¡ 1)(1 + ¹ p)
1 + ¯ + (®+¯)¹ p
¹ Á
¹ Á¿n ¡ ¿ e Q ¹ n0;
st = ¹ s1 ´
® ¹ p
1 + ¯ + (®+¯)¹ p > ¹ s0:
(18)
Proposition 2: (i) 8 (A0; e0; g0; G) 2 ~ ¨, 9 a unique steady state in which,
8 t > 0; ht+1 = 1 , et+1 = 0 , gt+2 = 0 , At+2 = At+1; nt = ¹ n0, and st
= ¹ s0: 8 t > 0; the economy remains in this Malthusian steady state. (ii) 8
(A0; e0; g0; G) = 2 ~ ¨; 9 a unique balanced growth path (BGP) in which ht+1 =
¹ h = 1+ ¹ e, gt+2 = ¹ g > 0 , At+2 = (1+ ¹ g)At+1; nt = ¹ n1 Q ¹ n0; and st = ¹ s1 >
¹ s0: 8 (A0; e0; g0; G) = 2 ~ ¨; the economy settles asymptotically on the balanced
growth path (BGP) as t ! 1: (iii) For any (A0; e0; g0; G), the economy
will either converge to the no-growth steady state in (i) or will continue to
grow endogenously as described in (ii).
19Proof: See Appendix section 9.2.
Figure 2 depicts the long-run evolution of the state variables At and et. The two
equations in (16) completely characterize the dynamics of the economy. If (A0; e0; g0;
G) = 2 ~ ¨ , the economy starts out in regime (II). And if (A0; e0; g0; G) 2 ~ ¨ , the economy
begins in regime (I){or (I) [ (I)
0
if G is smaller. For an economy in (I) or (I) [ (I)
0
,
8 t > 0; At = A1 and et = 0. For an economy that starts out in (II), the EE locus,
EE ´ et+1 ¡ et = 0; is upward sloping. However, the AA locus, AA ´ At+1 ¡ At = 0,
depends on whether population, Lt, exceeds L¤ or not (and consequently, whether the
rate of technological progress, gt+1, is strictly positive or zero). When Lt · L¤, the AA
locus covers the space (II) entirely. In that case, there are no dynamics (past the ¯rst
period) until Lt exceeds L¤. When Lt > L¤, however, the AA locus lies on the At = 0
line (the diagram only depicts the case when Lt > L¤).
The ¯gure also illustrates the impact of a more advantageous geographic location
on the long-run evolution of the economy. In essence, a higher G contracts the set to (I)
from that given by (I) [ (I)
0
, and makes it more likely that the economy will initially be
in regime (II).
[Figure 2 about here.]
As Proposition 1 makes clear, economies that start out with identically primitive
technologies and little or no human capital still evolve di®erently over time to the extent
that their geographic characteristics di®er. Even in regions where geographic conditions
are favorable to an eventual economic and demographic takeo® from the Malthusian
regime, however, the transition process may take long. The reason for this is that the
rate of technological progress, which depends on the stock of education and population
size, is zero initially. But steady population growth andinvestment in education combine
to eventually trigger a process of technological change. This in turn raises the return
to education and geographically favorable economies enter the post-Malthusian phase
during which fertility and educational attainment increase and life expectancy improves.
205. From Geography to Institutions
The model above ascribes a very important role to geographic characteristics in trigger-
ing the modern demographic transition and generating the human capital accumulation
necessary for sustained technological progress. And the model presented so far best de-
scribes the very long-run evolution of economies that have no outside access to superior
technologies{either because their existing technology is already at the world frontier or
because their institutional arrangements do not favor technology transfers. But what
if an underdeveloped economy can import and adopt sophisticated technologies? After
all, an advanced technology can make up for the negative impact of an adverse geog-
raphy in the sense that, for any G; there exists a level of technology At such that (At;
et; gt; G) = 2 ~ ¨.25 This would put any economy on the path of demographic transition
and economic prosperity once technologies improve enough. Hence, while geography and
natural resources are important in understanding the origins of economic development
and demographic transition, they may have a minor and diminishing role in explaining
the varying paths taken by the less developed countries since the European Industrial
Revolution. In fact, in a world where the technology frontier is relatively more advanced
institutions will become more important. The reason is that, if countries' legal, ¯nancial
and political institutions help to promote technology transfers and adoption, then all
economies would have a combination (At; et; gt; G) = 2 ~ ¨ at some point.26 And the pro-
cess of demographic transition and economic development would eventually kick start
despite a country's geography.
Cross-country di®erences in geography introduce the possibility of multiple equi-
libria in this model. And economies' prospects diverge mostly due to the indirect impact
of geography on households' economic and demographic decisions. It is important to
note, however, that geographic characteristics also directly in°uence production. Thus,
25McNeill (1998, pp. 46-47) explains how this mechanism was at work even during ancient times when
he notes, \Never before had a dominant, large-bodied species been able to spread all around the globe.
Humans could accomodate this feat because they learned how to create micro-environments suitable to
the survival of a tropical creature under widely varying [ecological] conditions. Invention of di®erent
sorts of clothing did the trick, insulating the human body from extremes of climate and assuring survival
despite freezing temperatures."
26For the purposes of this discussion, I employ a narrow and admittedly loose de¯nition of what
institutions entail by focusing only on their role in allowing cross-sountry technology transfers and
adoption. Nonetheless, to the extent that the creation and emergence of institutions that secure property
rights that foster productive activities are a by-product of the human capital accumulation process (as
discussed on page 12), the cross-country transfer and adoption of these more broadly de¯ned institutions
of private property become more relevant.
21while the creation of institutions that promote technology transfer and adoption can
eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria, they will not be su±cient to o®set the direct
geography e®ect. Nonetheless, small di®erences in geographic characteristics can lead to
highly divergent paths of economic progress due to the indirect geography e®ect, which
progress-friendly institutions will help to eliminate.
6. Numerical Examples
In this section I provide a computational analysis to highlight some of the main conclu-
sions. The simulations discussed here are intended to be suggestive and are not designed
to capture precisely all of the quantitative aspects of human progress. Nonetheless, they
help to illustrate that initial di®erences in geographic endowments go a long way in gen-
erating the empirically consistent patterns of demographicchange, technological progress
and economic development.
I simulate the above-described economy for roughly 5,000 years. This corresponds
to 200 model periods based on a generation gap of about 25 years. In order to carry
out the simulations, I ¯rst assign speci¯c functional forms to how survival odds, pt+1,
are related to income, It{the generalized version of which was introduced in equation
(3){and the explicit relationship between the average education level of the economy, et,

















µ > 0; 1 > ±;´ > 0; (20)
where (19) satis¯es the properties discussed on page 10, and (20) those presented after
equation (7). And to specify the e®ect of the level of technology on the education
premium, I assume
22Át = (Ã + At)À Ã > 0; 1 > À > 0: (21)
In (21), Ã > 0 ensures that (A.1) is satis¯ed. I then parameterize the model and
assign initial values to the state variables, At, and et. There are 13 variables and 3 initial
values (two for the state variables A0 and e0, one for the pseudo-state variable L0) that
need to be parameterized. I simulate the economy for ¯ve di®erent sets of parameter
speci¯cations. Table 1 presents my parameter choices.
[Table 1 about here.]
In all simulations, I set most parameter values{such as those in equations (19)-
(21){at their chosen values for convenience. Given that I am modeling the very long run
evolution of human kind, I also choose the initial average education level, e0, to be zero
and the initial level of the technology, A0, to be a small positive value.
The ¯rst simulation, for which the evolutions of population, saving rate, fertility,
and education are provided in Figure 3, compares two economies that di®er in their
geographic endowments by 40 percent.27 In the ¯gure, G equals 1.0 for the economy
shown by the solid line, and it equals 0.60 for the other shown by the dashed line. Under
these parameter speci¯cations, economy (a) is inregime(II) whereit is set for aneventual
takeo®, and economy (b) is in regime (I) where it can never escape the Malthusian
trap. As the simulation results show, even for economy (a) it takes about 170 model
periods(or approximately 4,300years)forthe economy toundergo the transitionfromthe
Malthusian world to the modern one. Once that transition begins, the quickening pace
of technological progress leads to an increase and then a decrease in population growth,
and life expectancy and the average education level increase rapidly as the demographic
transition phase starts to unfold. What is also interesting in this simulation is that
the geographic endowment of economy (b) is not even abundant enough to sustain a
27Columns (a) and (b) of Table 1 provide a comparison of these two economies.
23growingor even astablepopulation. Infact, within10generations theeconomy'sworking
population reaches roughly one-tenth of its initial level of 10,000.
The second simulation, for which results are depicted in Figure 4, shows a com-
parison of economy (a) with another that eventually undergoes demographic transition.
Hence, both economies begin in regime (II). The only di®erence between them is that
their geographic characteristics di®er only by 10 percent.28 In the ¯gure, G equals 1 for
the economy shown by the solid line, and it equals 1.1 for the other shown by the dashed
line. This simulation illustrates how large the impact of geographic characteristics can
be on delaying the shift from the Malthusian world to the post-Malthusian regime, and
eventually from that to the modern transition era. Economy (a), for which G equals
1, enters the post-Malthusian era roughly 15 model periods or four centuries later than
economy (c), for which G equals 1.1.
[Figures 3 and 4 about here.]
The third simulation calibrates the model tomatch the historic populationdynam-
ics of Western Europe.29 The parameter values for this simulation, which were chosen to
match the implied population dynamics as close as possible, are listed in Table 1, column
(d). The results are shown in Figure 5. The ¯rst panel presents the levels of population
predicted by the model (shown by the solid line) as well as the estimates constructed
based on Maddison (shown by the dashed line) and Russell (shown by the dotted line).
The following three panels respectively show the fertility rate, the mortality rate and
28Column (c) of Table 1 provides the parameter speci¯cations for this new economy.
29For the purposes of this exercise, Western European countries include Austria, the British Isles,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. I rely on a variety of
sources to construct the population data: Russell(1972) provides estimates for Medieval Europe between
500 A.D. and 1450 A.D. and Maddison (2001) constructs Western European population estimates as far
back as year zero. Utilizing these and the population growth rates computed by Kremer (1993), Jones
(1999), and Weil (2001), I extrapolate Western European population for the earlier years for which
estimates do not exist. Table 2.a provides the data put together by Russell and Maddison as well as
the world population growth rates between 3000 B.C. and 1998 calculated by Jones (2001). Table 2.b
presents the population series that I have constructed relying on estimates by Maddison, Russell and
Jones (1999).
24the net population growth rate. In general, the model matches the historical Western
European population trend rather nicely. It does, however, overshoot the level of the
population for a number of periods{just like in Jones (2001){and under-predicts it for
the last century. As can be seen by the drop in actual population around the early 15th
century, one reason for the model to overshoot the actual level of European population
until the very ¯nal periods is the dramatic rise in mortality and the associated decline
in population in the late 14th century due to Black Death.
In the ¯nal simulation I replicate the above exercise for Africa.30 The parameter
values for this simulation are listed in the ¯nal column of Table 1. They are identical to
the ones selected for the Western European simulation with the exception that G now
equals 0:75 instead of 1: The results are shown in Figure 6. There are two somewhat
surprising results: One, with G equals 0:75, the ¯t of the model with actual population
dynamics is extremely well until the last three or four model periods. And two, even
with G equals 1 (for which the population dynamics are depicted by the dashed line
in the top panel); the model falls well short of explaining the African population boom
witnessed during the 20th century. One can attribute at least part of this growth to
the introduction of better health care by European colonial settlers and missionaries in
the late-19th and early-20th centuries.31 In fact, the rates of population growth in less-
developedcountries are still far higher thanthoseexperienced during theaftermathofthe
Industrial Revolution, suggesting that the adoption of more sophisticated technologies{
at least in health care{might have begun to dilute the role of geography in development
and demography.
[Figures 5 and 6 about here.]
30The methodology that I employ is idenitcal to the one above except for the fact that population
estimates are now based on Maddison (2001) and Biraben. See Tables 3.a and 3.b for the underlying
data and my estimates.
31Most of the improvement in health care was simply attributed to a separation of clean water and
waste water. Atack and Passell (1994) discuss the extent to which ¯ltering the water supply, which
began in the United States during the 19th century, can lead to improvements in public health.
257. Implications and Further Discussion
The model laid out above has a number of speci¯c implications, some of which I have
already discussed. In this section, I highlight some of the major ones more formally and
present the supporting evidence that are relevant to each.
I) Geographic characteristics help to explain di®erences in early development as well
as those in long-term demographic trends. One novel implication of the model presented
here is that favorable geographic characteristics will be su±cient to kick start a demo-
graphic transition that is commensurate with the very long experience of human kind.
Another is the notion that the geography of a region will manifest itself in the devel-
opment of economies that inhabit a given location. McNeill (1998, p. 67) stresses this
notion most clearly when he notes, \[Climate], more than anything else, is why Africa
remained backwardinthe development of civilization when compared totemperate lands
(or tropical zones like those of the Americas), where prevailing ecosystems were less elab-
orated and correspondingly less inimical to simpli¯cation by human action. Ecosystems
in the regions of the earth where early and historically important agricultural societies
¯rst developed were all intrinsically less resistant to human alteration than in tropical
Africa." What needs to be emphasized in this context is the inextricable link between
economic performance and demographic change{the theoretical precursors of which were
initially laid out in Becker, Murphy, and Tamura, Galor and Weil (1996, 1998), and
Jones (2001). This link would suggest geography as an important factor that a®ects the
joint evolution of technological progress, early development, and demographic transition.
The model above speci¯cally suggests that favorable geographic characteristics
should lead to higher population densities, most certainly in the early phases of develop-
ment. Table 4 and Figure 7 show the results of a test of this prediction using 1,500 A.D.
population density data for Western Europe and its colonial o®shoots.32 I con¯ne at-
32The geography data are solely from Parker (1997). For each country they include latitude,
LATITUDEj; normalized measures of average annual temperature, TEMPj, average morning hu-
midity, HUMIDj, cumulative total share of world mineral resources, MINERALj, and a dummy
for whether the country is landlocked, LLOCKj. The population density data, with the exception of
those for Western Europe, are borrowed from Acemoglu et al. (2001) who in turn derive them from
data provided by McEvedy and Jones (1978). Those for Western Europe are derived from McEvedy
and Jones and the CIA World Fact Book. In addition to aggregated data for Western Europe, the
sample includes 41 observations for Argentina, Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cost Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatamala,
Guyana, Hong Kong, Honduras, Haiti, Indonesia, India, Jamaica, Laos, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Mexico,
Malaysia, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Paraguay, Singapore,
Tunisia, Uruguay, the United States, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
26tention to this subset because, together with Western Europe, it comprises countries for
which Acemoglu et al. (2001) demonstrate that institutions{but not geography{played a
role in their economic development since the 19th century. Columns (1)-(3) show the re-
sults from the OLS speci¯cations, and (4)-(6) those from robust regressions that correct
for outlier biases. As shown in the table, there is a statistically signi¯cant relationship
betweenpopulation density in1,500 A. D. and humidity under all speci¯cations, between
temperature and population density under (5) and (6), and between population density
and latitude under (4). Figure 7 isolates the e®ect of humidity as speci¯ed in (3) and
illustrates its impact on population density. In general, these results support the idea
that geographic characteristics might have been important in early development.
II) Technological breakthroughs and the creation of progress-friendly institutions are
most likely to occur in economies with favorable geographies. Diamond extensively dis-
cusses why early civilizations ¯rst surfaced in the Fertile Crescent in the Mesopotamian
peninsula, Mesoamerica, and China. He also provides a compelling reason for why the
Industrial Revolution and its accompaniment of modern demographic change occurred
on the Eurasian continent: While all the former were regions where the climate was mild
and the natural supply of domesticable plant and animal species were relatively more
abundant, the Eurasian continent was the only one where the major axis of orientation
is east-west. This was a signi¯cant geographic bene¯t as \Eurasia's east-west axis al-
lowed the Fertile Crescent crops quickly to launchagriculture over the bandof temperate
latitudes from Ireland to the Indus Valley."
In addition, if one were to adopt a broader interpretation of the state variable At
where it covers the institutional characteristics of an economy, the model above would
also suggest that the establishment of institutions that promote economic progress ¯rst
occurs in geographically favorable regions.
III) Demographic transitions will ¯rst occur in geographically advantageous regions. To
the extent that technologies are transferable, they may subsequently occur elsewhere. In
this model, multiple equilibria may occur as the initial levels of average education and
technology, combined with the geographical characteristics of an economy, will deter-
mine whether an economy is trapped in a Malthusian state or it can eventually take o®
to undergo demographic change and economic development. Thus, a clear implication
is that the demographic transition from the Malthusian state to the modern regime as
well as the potential technological revolutions will ¯rst take place in, ceteris paribus,
27geographically favorable areas. This, of course, is the case. As just noted in (II), not
only did the Industrial Revolution take place in Europe but also many of the more ad-
vanced civilizations emerged in geographically advantageous areas throughout the course
of history. In addition, once the phase of post-Malthusian population growth started to
take place in such regions, population densities rose sharply and relatively more in places
where the climate was favorable and resources were abundant.33
When the pace of technological progress picks up somewhere, the world technology
frontier starts to expand. Therefore, a relevant issue is whether economies located in
geographically adverse regions can bene¯t from these technological improvements to
eventually escape their trap. On the one hand, if technologies were fully transferable,
it is clear that all economies{regardless of the extent to which their geographies are
unfavorable{would eventually emerge from the Malthusian trap. On the other hand,
the degree to which technologies are transferable across economies is questionable.34
Moreover, there exists work in the literature that suggests that the design and evolution
of institutions that foster economic growthand development might historically have been
driven by geographic characteristics.35
IV) Institutions that foster technology transfers and adoption will render the role of
geography in development and demography mostly obsolete. If countries' legal, ¯nan-
cial and political institutions help to promote technology transfers, then all economies
would eventually have a combination (A0; e0; g0; G) = 2 ~ ¨; and the process of demo-
graphic transition and economic development would kick start. Thus, the availability
of relatively sophisticated technologies for import would imply that, while geographical
characteristics might have a®ected the evolution of humankind early on, they do not help
to describe how less-developed economies began to evolve after the European Industrial
Revolution. Nor would they help to provide a description of how today's less-developed
countries may evolve in the future. Of course, the extent to which technologies are not
transferable and the existence of institutional features that hinder technology transfers
will ultimately determine whether geography remains important. The empirical evidence
provided by Hall and Jones, Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger suggests that geography con-
33An illluminating example of how human populations start to grow in the presence of resource
abundance is discussed in Weil (Ch. 4, p. 4). For more details, also see Larsen and Vaupel (1993) and
Livvi-Bacci.
34Basu and Weil (1998).
35See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (forthcoming).
28tinues to help explain the cross-country patterns of economic growth and development.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) claim however that, while geography might
have been important historically, institutional characteristics most signi¯cantly account
for the contemporary di®erences in growth and development.
8. Conclusion
During most of its history, humankind struggled for survival. This struggle was all the
more brutal where nature was not relatively cooperative. To what extent did the fate
of human societies depend on nature? More importantly, can di®erences in geographic
conditions help to explain the very long-run economic and demographic evolution of
human societies?
In this paper, I argue that they can. I present a uni¯ed economic growth theory
that focuses on geography in the very long run. The model links demographic transition
to geography and shows that geography a®ects the economy mostly indirectly via its
impact on economic decisions and demographics. The reason is that, by a®ecting the
odds of survival, geographic characteristics in°uence household decisions{includingthose
about the quantity and quality of children. And the latter in turn determine whether
economies eventually attain the scale and scope necessary for sustained technological
progress.
This link is made all the more relevant given the recent debate about the role of
geography versus that of institutions in economic progress. While this debate revolves
primarily around whether geographical characteristics or institutions account for the
contemporary cross-country di®erences in economic prosperity, there is a growing body
of evidence to shed doubt on a direct geography e®ect. At the same time, however, most
¯ndings are consistent with the view that geographic characteristics were important in
the emergence of agriculture and early development. A novel aspect of the model pre-
sented here is the incorporation of direct and indirect channels through which geography
could potentially impact economic prosperity. It is this aspect of the model that demon-
strates how geography might have a®ected development in the early stages and why it
may matter less today.
299. Appendix
² 9.1. Proof of Proposition 1:










[1 + ¯ + (® +¯)pt+1]2 > 0;
(9.1.1)


























[1 + ¯ + (® +¯)pt+1]2[Át¿n ¡ ¿e]2
(9.1.3)
where ¦=f(1 + ¯)Át(Át¿n ¡ ¿e)p0 ¡ (1 + pt+1)[1+ ¯ + (® +¯)(1+ pt+1)]¿eÁ0g:Un-
der (A.1), limAt!0 (p0=Á0) = 1; and limAt!1 (p0=Á0) = 0: Moreover, ¦ > 0 i®
(At;et;gt;G) 2 ¨¤, and ¦ < 0 i® (At;et;gt;G) = 2 ¨¤. Thus, 8 (At;et;gt;G) 2 ¨¤;
@nt=@At > 0; and 8 (At;et;gt;G) = 2 ¨¤; @nt=@At · 0: 2
² 9.2. Proof of Proposition 2: (i) If (A0; e0; g0; G) 2 ~ ¨; then e1 = 0 ) h1 = 1 )
g2 = g(0) = 0 ) A2 = A1: Thus, 8 t ¸ 1; et = 0; gt+1 = 0; and At+1 = At. As a
30result, 8 t ¸ 1, nt = ¹ n0, and st = ¹ s0; (ii) If (A0; e0; g0; G) = 2 ~ ¨; then e1 > 0 )
h1 > 1 ) g2 = g(e1) > 0 ) A2 = (1 + g2) A1 > A1: Thus, 8 t ¸ 1; et > 0; gt+1
> 0; and At+1 > At. And given that, 8 t ¸ 1, At+1 > At, the economy continues
to evolve. In the limit as t ! 1, At+1 ! 1 , pt+1 ! ¹ p, and as implied by (12),
et+1 ! ¹ e: Moreover, st ! ¹ s1; which due to Proposition 1, is strictly greater than
¹ s0. And, nt ! ¹ n1, which due to Proposition 2, may be less than, greater than or
equal to ¹ n0; (iii) Proof follows directly from the fact that both regimes (I) and (II)
are ergodic.
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35Figure 2:      The Phase Diagram (Lt > L
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                Table 1: Parameter Choices and Initial Value of State Variables
Parameters (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
G 1 0:6 1:1 1 0:75
¿n 0:30 0:30 0:30 0:297475 0:297475
¿e 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:1025 0:1025
® 0:75 0:75 0:75 0:75 0:75
¯ 0:75 0:75 0:75 0:749375 0:749375
° 0:75 0:75 0:75 0:50 0:50
¸ 1 1 1 1 1
µ 0:50 0:50 0:50 0:40 0:40
± 0:25 0:25 0:25 0:25 0:25
´ 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:075 0:075
Ã 104 104 104 104 104
À 0:25 0:25 0:25 0:25 0:25
L¤ 100;000 100;000 100;000 35;000;000 35;000;000
State Variables
A0 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1
e0 0 0 0 0 0
L0 10;000 10;000 10;000 228;000 224;000
43Table 2.a: Western European Population Data
Year Maddison¤ Russell¤¤ World Pop. Growth¤¤¤
(in millions) (in millions) (a.a.r. over prec. period)
¡3000 n.a. n.a. 0:000693
¡2000 n.a. n.a. 0:000657
¡1000 n.a. n.a. 0:000616
¡500 n.a. n.a. 0:001386
¡200 n.a. n.a. 0:001352
0 24:700 n.a. 0:000626
200 n.a. n.a. 0:000556
400 n.a. n.a. 0
500 n.a. 21:000 n.a.
600 n.a. n.a. 0:000256
650 n.a. 14:500 n.a.
800 n.a. n.a. 0:000477
1000 25:413 29:000 0:000931
1100 n.a. n.a. 0:001886
1200 n.a. n.a. 0:001178
1300 n.a. n.a. 0
1340 n.a. 60:500 n.a.
1400 n.a. n.a. ¡0:000282
1450 n.a. 41:500 n.a.
1500 57:268 n.a. 0:001942
1600 73:778 n.a. 0:002487
1700 81:460 n.a. 0:001127
1800 n.a. n.a. 0:003889
1820 132:888 n.a. n.a.
1900 n.a. n.a. 0:005909
1913 261:007 n.a. n.a.
1950 305:060 n.a. n.a.
1998 388:399 n.a. 0:011884
¤ Source: Maddison (2001).
¤¤ Source: Russell (1972).
¤ ¤¤ Source: Jones (2001).
44Table 2.b: Western European Population Estimates (in millions)
Year (a) (b) (c) (d)
I Maddison¤ II Russell¤¤
¡3000 0:519 n.a. 0:392 n.a.
¡2000 1:541 n.a. 1:144 n.a.
¡1000 3:943 n.a. 2:980 n.a.
¡500 12:844 n.a. 9:705 n.a.
¡200 21:608 n.a. 16:328 n.a.
0 24:700 24:700 18:665 n.a.
200 17:750 n.a. 21:000 n.a.
400 17:750 n.a. ... n.a.
500 ::: n.a. 21:000 21:000
600 18:708 n.a. 11:042 n.a.
650 ... n.a. 14:500 14:500
800 20:681 n.a. ... n.a.
1000 25:413 25:413 29:000 29:000
1100 41:859 n.a. 53:373 n.a.
1200 47:448 n.a. 60:500 n.a.
1300 47:448 n.a. 60:500 n.a.
1340 ... n.a. 60:500 60:500
1400 46:147 n.a. ... n.a.
1450 ... n.a. 41:500 41:500
1500 57:268 57:268 49:559 n.a.
1600 73:778 73:778 61:885 n.a.
1700 81:460 81:460 68:859 n.a.
1800 ... n.a. 95:638 n.a.
1820 132:888 132:888 ... n.a.
1900 ... n.a. 152:151 n.a.
1913 261:007 261:007 175:657 n.a.
1950 305:060 305:060 250:808 n.a.
1998 388:399 388:399 388:399 388:399
¤ Source: Maddison (2001).
¤¤ Source: Russell (1972).
45Table 3.a: African Population Data
Year Maddison¤ Biraben¤ World Pop. Growth¤¤
(in millions) (in millions) (a.a.r. over prec. period)
¡3000 n.a. n.a. 0:000693
¡2000 n.a. n.a. 0:000657
¡1000 n.a. n.a. 0:000616
¡500 n.a. n.a. 0:001386
¡200 n.a. n.a. 0:001352
0 16:500 26:000 0:000626
200 n.a. n.a. 0:000556
400 n.a. n.a. 0
500 n.a. n.a. n.a.
600 n.a. n.a. 0:000256
650 n.a. 14:500 n.a.
800 n.a. n.a. 0:000477
1000 33:000 39:000 0:000931
1100 n.a. n.a. 0:001886
1200 n.a. n.a. 0:001178
1300 n.a. n.a. 0
1340 n.a. 60:500 n.a.
1400 n.a. n.a. ¡0:000282
1450 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1500 46:000 87:000 0:001942
1600 55:000 113:000 0:002487
1700 61:000 107:000 0:001127
1800 n.a. 102:000 0:003889
1820 74:200 n.a. n.a.
1900 110:000 138:000 0:005909
1913 124:700 n.a. n.a.
1950 228:300 219:000 n.a.
2000 759:954 759:954 0:011884
¤ Source: Maddison (2001).
¤¤ Source: Jones (2001).
46Table 3.b: African Population Estimates (in millions)
Year (a) (b) (c) (d)
III Maddison¤ IV Biraben¤
¡3000 0:347 n.a. 0:547 n.a.
¡2000 1:011 n.a. 1:594 n.a.
¡1000 2:634 n.a. 4:150 n.a.
¡500 8:580 n.a. 13:520 n.a.
¡200 14:434 n.a. 22:745 n.a.
0 16:500 16:500 26:000 26:000
200 23:050 n.a. 22:905 n.a.
400 23:050 n.a. 27:240 n.a.
500 ... n.a. ... n.a.
600 24:293 n.a. 28:710 n.a.
650 ... n.a. ... n.a.
800 26:855 n.a. 31:738 n.a.
1000 33:000 33:000 39:000 39:000
1100 33:622 n.a. 63:590 n.a.
1200 38:112 n.a. 72:082 n.a.
1300 38:112 n.a. 72:082 n.a.
1340 ... n.a. ... n.a.
1400 37:067 n.a. 70:105 n.a.
1450 ... n.a. ... n.a.
1500 46:000 46:000 87:000 87:000
1600 55:000 55:000 113:000 113:000
1700 61:000 61:000 107:000 107:000
1800 ... n.a. 102:000 102:000
1820 74:200 74:200 ... n.a.
1870 90:500 90:500 ... n.a.
1900 110:000 110:000 138:000 138:000
1950 228:300 228:300 216:700 216:700
1998 759:954 759:954 759:954 759:954
¤ Source: Maddison (2001).
47Table 4: OLS and Robust Regressions
Dependent Variable: POPULATION DENSITY, 1,500 A. D.
(Person/Square km.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LATITUDEj 13:11 ::: 23:71 ¡93:51¤¤ ::: 37:01
(17:40) (16:52) (42:27) (233:9)
TEMPj ::: 5:06 11:94 ::: 7:61¤¤ 7:92¤¤¤
(12:77) (13:48) (3:77) (4:65)
HUMIDt ::: ¡52:77¤ ¡54:20¤ ::: ¡32:59¤ ¡32:26¤
(14:31) (14:14) (4:24) (4:62)
MINERALj ::: ¡9:83 ¡9:35 ::: ¡3:89 ¡4:03
(12:33) (12:16) (3:65) (3:75)
LLOCKj ::: ¡6:50 ¡5:48 ::: ¡3:00 ¡3:00
(8:85) (8:75) (2:62) (2:66)
No: of obs: 42 42 42 42 42 42
R2 :014 :286 :325 ::: ::: :::
Note: *, **, *** respectively denote signi¯cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10
percent levels. Columns (4)-(6) show robust regression results.
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